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Abstract
Derivative longevity risk solutions, such as bespoke and indexed longevity
swaps, allow pension schemes, and annuity providers to swap out longevity
risk, but introduce counterparty credit risk, which can be mitigated if not fully
eliminated by collateralization. We examine the impact of bilateral default
risk and collateral rules on the marking to market of longevity swaps, and
show how longevity swap rates must be determined endogenously from
the collateral flows associated with the marking-to-market procedure. For
typical interest rate and mortality parameters, we find that the impact of
collateralization is modest in the presence of symmetric default risk, but more
pronounced when default risk and/or collateral rules are asymmetric. Our
results suggest that the overall cost of collateralization is comparable with,
and often much smaller than, that found in the interest rate swaps market,
which may then provide the appropriate reference framework for the credit
enhancement of both indemnity-based and indexed longevity risk solutions.
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Introduction
The market for longevity-linked securities and derivatives has recently experienced
a surge in transactions in longevity swaps (Blake et al., 2013). These pure longevity
hedges are agreements between two parties to exchange fixed payments against vari-
able payments linked to the number of survivors in a reference population (see Dowd
et al., 2006). Table 1 presents the full list of deals that have been publicly disclosed in
the United Kingdom. So far, transactions have mainly involved pension funds and an-
nuity providers wanting to hedge their exposure to longevity risk1 but without having
to bear any basis risk. The variable payments in such longevity swaps are designed to
match precisely the mortality experience of each individual hedger, hence the name
“bespoke longevity swap.” This is essentially a form of longevity risk insurance, simi-
lar to annuity reinsurance in reinsurance markets. Indeed, most of the longevity swaps
executed to date have been bespoke, indemnity-based swaps of the kind familiar in
reinsurance markets. This is true despite the fact that some of the swaps listed in
Table 1 have been arranged by investment banks: the banks have worked with insur-
ance companies (in some cases their own insurance company subsidiaries) in order to
deliver a solution in a format familiar to the counterparty. A fundamental difference
from other forms of reinsurance, however, is that longevity swaps are typically col-
lateralized, whereas standard insurance/reinsurance transactions are not.2 The main
reason is that longevity swaps are often part of a wider derisking strategy involving
other collateralized instruments (e.g., interest rate and inflation swaps), and also the
fact that hedgers have been increasingly concerned with counterparty risk3 in the
wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–2009. In this article, we provide a frame-
work to quantify the trade-off between the exposure to counterparty risk in longevity
swaps and the cost of credit enhancement strategies such as collateralization.
As there is no accepted framework yet for marking to market/model longevity swaps,
hedgers and hedge suppliers have looked to other markets to provide a reference
model for counterparty risk assessment and mitigation. In interest rate swap mar-
kets, for example, the most common form of credit enhancement is the posting of
collateral. According to the International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA),
almost every swap at major financial institutions is “bilaterally” collateralized (ISDA,
2010a), meaning that either party is required to post collateral depending on whether
the market value of the swap is positive or negative.4 The vast majority of transactions
1By longevity risk we mean exposure to the systematic risk of mortality improvements, which
cannot be mitigated by pooling together large numbers of lives.
2One rationale for this is that reinsurers aggregate several uncorrelated risks, and pool-
ing/diversification benefits compensate for the absence of collateral (e.g., Cummins and
Trainar, 2009; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2012; Kessler, 2013). Insurers/reinsurers are still re-
quired by their regulators to post regulatory or solvency capital, which plays a similar role to
collateral but at aggregate level.
3Basel II (2006, Annex 4) defines counterparty risk as “the risk that the counterparty to a trans-
action could default before the final settlement of the transaction’s cash flows.” The new
Solvency II standard makes explicit allowance for a counterparty risk module in its “standard
formula” approach; see CEIOPS (2009).
4“Unlike a firm’s exposure to credit risk through a loan, where the exposure to credit risk is
unilateral and only the lending bank faces the risk of loss, counterparty credit risk creates a
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Table 1
Publicly Announced Longevity Swap Transactions In the UK 2007–2014
Date Hedger Size Term (Years) Type Interm./Hedge
Supplier
Apr. 2007 Friends’ Provident GBP 1.7bn Run-off Bespoke Swiss Re
Jan. 2008 Lucida N.A. 10 Indexed JP Morgan
ILS funds
Jul. 2008 Canada Life GBP 500 m 40 Bespoke JP Morgan
ILS funds
Feb. 2009 Abbey Life GBP 1.5 bn Run-off Bespoke Deutsche Bank
ILS funds, Partner Re
Mar. 2009 Aviva GBP 475 m 10 Bespoke Royal Bank
of Scotland
Jun. 2009 Babcock GBP 750 m 50 Bespoke Credit Suisse
International Pacific Life Re
Jul. 2009 RSA GBP 1.9 bn Run-off Bespoke Goldman Sachs
(Rothesay Life)
Dec. 2009 Berkshire Council GBP 750 m Run-off Bespoke Swiss Re
Feb. 2010 BMW UK GBP 3 bn Run-off Bespoke Deutsche Bank
Paternoster
Feb. 2011 Pall (UK) GBP 70 m 10 Indexed JP Morgan
Pension Fund
Aug. 2011 ITV GBP 1.7 bn N.A. Bespoke Credit Suisse
Nov. 2011 Rolls Royce GBP 3 bn N.A. Bespoke Deutsche Bank
Dec. 2011 British Airways GBP 1.3 bn N.A. Bespoke Goldman Sachs
(Rothesay Life)
Jan. 2012 Pilkington GBP 1 bn N.A. Bespoke Legal & General
Apr. 2012 Berkshire Council GBP 100 m Run-off Bespoke Swiss Re
May 2012 Akzo Nobel GBP 1.4 bn N.A. Bespoke Swiss Re
Dec. 2012 LV= GBP 800 m N.A. Bespoke Swiss Re
Feb. 2013 BAE Systems GBP 3.2 bn N.A. Bespoke Legal & General
(30%), Hannover
Re (70%)
May 2013 Bentley Pension
Scheme (owned
by VW)
GBP 400m N.A. Bespoke Deutsche Bank
(Abbey Life)
Dec. 2013 Carillion GPB 1 bn N.A. Bespoke Deutsche Bank
Dec. 2013 AstraZeneca GBP 2.5 bn N.A. Bespoke Deutsche Bank
Dec. 2013 BAE Systems
(Royal Ordnance/
Shipbuilding
Industries)
GBP 1.8 bn N.A. Bespoke Legal & General
Hannover Re (85%
of RO), Reinsurance
Group of America
(70% of SI)
Mar. 2014 Aviva Staff Pension
Scheme
GBP 5bn N.A. Bespoke Munich Re, Scor and
Swiss Re
May 2014 Royal London GBP 1bn N.A. Bespoke RGA International
July 2014 BT Pension Scheme GBP 16bn N.A. Bespoke Prudential Insurance
Co. of America
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are collateralized according to the Credit Support Annex (CSA) to the Master Swap
Agreement introduced by ISDA (1994). The Global Financial Crisis highlighted the
importance of bilateral counterparty risk and collateralization for over-the-counter
markets, spurring a number of responses (e.g., ISDA, 2009; Brigo and Capponi, 2009;
Assefa et al., 2010; Brigo, Pallavicini, and Papatheodorou, 2011; Brigo, Capponi, and
Pallavicini, 2014). The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(signed into law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010) is likely to have a major
impact on the way financial institutions will manage counterparty risk in the coming
years.5 The recently established Life and Longevity Markets Association (LLMA)6 has
counterparty risk at the center of its agenda, and will certainly draw extensively from
the experience garnered in fixed-income and credit markets.
Collateralization strategies address the concerns aired by pension trustees regarding
the efficacy of longevity swaps, but introduce another dimension in the traditional
pricing framework used for insurance transactions. The “insurance premium” em-
bedded in a longevity swap rate reflects not only the aversion/appetite of the coun-
terparties for the risk being transferred and the cost of regulatory capital involved
in the transaction, but also the expected costs to be incurred from posting collateral
during the life of the swap. To understand these costs, let us first take the perspective
of a hedge supplier (reinsurer or investment bank) issuing a collateralized longevity
swap to a counterparty (pension fund or annuity provider). Whenever the swap is
sufficiently out of the money to the hedge supplier, the hedge supplier is required
to post collateral, which can be used by the hedger to mitigate losses in the event of
default. Although interest on collateral is typically rebated, there is both a funding
cost and an opportunity cost, as the posting of collateral depletes the resources the
hedge supplier can use to meet her capital requirements at the aggregate level as well
as to write additional business. On the other hand, whenever the swap is sufficiently
in the money to the hedge supplier, the hedge supplier will receive collateral from the
counterparty, thus benefiting from capital relief in regulatory valuations and freeing
up capital that can be used to sell additional longevity protection. The benefits can be
far larger if collateral can be repledged for other purposes, as in the interest-rate swaps
market.7 The same considerations can be made from the viewpoint of the hedger, but
the funding needs and opportunity costs of the two parties are unlikely to offset each
other exactly. This is particularly relevant for transactions involving parties subject to
different regulatory frameworks. In the United Kingdom and several other countries,
bilateral risk of loss: the market value of the transaction can be positive or negative to either
counterparty to the transaction. The market value is uncertain and can vary over time with
the movement of underlying market factors” (Basel II, 2006, Annex 4).
5See, for example, “Berkshire May Scale Back Derivative Sales After Dodd–Frank,” Bloomberg,
August 10, 2010.
6See http://www.llma.org.
7According to ISDA (2010a), the vast majority of collateral is rehypothecated for other purposes
in interest rate swap markets. Currently, collateral can be repledged under the New York Credit
Support Annex, but not under the English Credit Support Deed (see ISDA, 2010b).
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for example, longevity risk exposures are more capital intensive for hedge suppliers,
such as insurers, than for pension funds.8
In the absence of collateral, and ignoring longevity risk aversion, swap rates9 depend
on best estimate survival probabilities for the hedged population and on the degree of
covariation between the floating leg of the swap and the defaultable term structure of
interest rates facing the hedger and the hedge supplier. This means that a proper anal-
ysis of a longevity swap cannot disregard the sponsor’s covenant when the hedger is
a pension plan (see the “Counterparty Default Risk” section below). In the presence of
collateralization, longevity swap rates are also shaped by the expected collateral costs,
and swap valuation formulae involve a discount rate reflecting the cost of collateral.
As a result, default-free valuation formulae are not appropriate even in the presence
of full collateralization and the corresponding absence of default losses.10
We quantify collateral costs in two ways: (1) in terms of funding costs that are incurred
or mitigated when collateral is posted or received, and (2) as the opportunity cost of
selling additional longevity protection. In both cases, we find that for typical interest
rate and mortality parameters, the impact of collateralization on swap rates is modest
when default risk and collateral rules are symmetric. The main reason is that longevity
risk and interest rate risk have countervailing effects that dilute the overall impact of
collateralization on swap rates:
(1) On the one hand, the receiver of the fixed survival rate (the hedge supplier) posts
collateral when mortality is lower and hence longevity exposures are more capital
intensive. On the other hand, she receives collateral when mortality is higher and
longevity protection is less capital intensive. The overall effect is to push swap rates
higher, to compensate the hedge supplier for the positive dependence between
collateral posting and capital costs.
(2) When the hedger or hedge supplier is out of the money, collateral outflows are
larger in low-interest-rate environments (i.e., when liabilities are discounted at a
lower rate); hence, there is a negative relationship between the amount of collat-
eral posted and the counterparties’ funding/opportunity costs. This mitigates the
overall impact of collateralization on longevity swap rates.
When default risk and/or collateral rules are asymmetric, the opposing effects are of
different magnitudes and, as a result, the impact of collateral costs on longevity swap
rates is larger. For example, we find that swap rates decrease substantially when the
hedger has a lower credit standing (i.e., higher funding costs) and full collateralization
is used, or when collateral rules are more favorable to the hedge supplier. Although
collateralization introduces an explicit link between the individual risk exposures and
the hedge supplier’s funding risk (hence some of the pooling/diversification benefits
8This asymmetry is, in part, a by-product of rules allowing, for example, pension liabilities to be
quantified by using outdated mortality tables or discount rates reflecting optimistic expected
returns on the pension funds’ investments.
9Defined as the rates in the fixed legs of the swap zeroing its market value at inception.
10See Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) for the case of symmetric default risk and full collater-
alization in interest rate swaps.
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used to substitute for collateralization in the standard insurance model may be lost),
in our examples we find that the opposite effects of longevity and interest rate risk,
and the different nature of the risk on which the swap is written (a floating rate in
the case of interest rate swaps, a smoother survival curve in the case of longevity
swaps) make the overall impact of collateralization comparable with, and typically
lower than, that observed in fixed-income markets (e.g., Johannes and Sundaresan,
2007). An important implication is that the interest rate swaps market might provide
an appropriate framework for the collateralization of bespoke longevity solutions,
even though such solutions lack of the transparency and standardization benefits
associated with indexed-based instruments. Investment banks have sold index-based
longevity swaps that have a structure that would be more familiar to capital markets
investors, but they have so far been less popular than bespoke solutions.
On the methodological side, we show how longevity swap rates must be determined
endogenously from the dynamic marking to market11 of the swap and the collateral
rules specified by the contract. To see why, note that the market value of the swap at
each valuation date depends on the evolution of the relevant state variables (mortality,
interest rates, credit spreads), as well as on the swap rate locked in at inception. On the
other hand, the swap’s market value will typically affect collateral amounts and, in a
setting where collateral is costly, will embed the market value of the costs associated
with future collateral flows. Hence, the swap rate can only be determined by explicitly
taking into account the marking-to-market process and the dynamics of collateral
posting. To avoid the computational burden of nested Monte Carlo simulations, we use
an iterative procedure based on the least squares Monte Carlo (LSMC) approach12 (see
Glassermann, 2004, and references therein). We provide several numerical examples
showing how different collateralization rules shape longevity swap rates giving rise to
margins in (best estimate) survival probabilities reflecting the cost of future collateral
flows. Although our focus is on longevity risk solutions, the approach can be applied
to other instruments, such as over-the-counter solutions for inflation and credit risk.
Our work contributes to the existing literature on longevity risk pricing in at least
three ways: (1) we introduce default risk in the pricing of longevity risk solutions and
properly address its bilateral nature; (2) we explicitly allow for collateralization rules,
which are the backbone of any real-world hedging solution and materially affect the
pricing of over-the-counter transactions; (3) we introduce a “structural” dimension in
an otherwise reduced-form pricing framework, by allowing for funding/opportunity
costs associated with longevity risk exposures held by hedgers and hedge suppliers.
11Here and in what follows, by “market value” and “marking to market” we mean that assets
and liabilities are valued according to a market-consistent valuation model or regulatory
standard.
12A similar approach is used by Bacinello, Biffis, and Millossovich (2009, 2010) for surrender
guarantees in life policies and by Bauer, Bergmann, and Reuß (2009) for the computation of
capital requirements within the Solvency II framework. The term American Monte Carlo is
often used in financial engineering to refer to this approach. We stick to the term Least Squares
Monte Carlo, as it is more common in the insurance industry (e.g., Ho¨rig and Leitschkis, 2012).
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As there is essentially no publicly available information on swap rates, our approach13
has the advantage of using publicly available information on credit markets and reg-
ulatory standards, without having to rely exclusively on calibration to primary in-
surance market prices, approximate hedging methods, or assumptions about agents’
risk preferences (e.g., Dowd et al., 2006; Ludkovski and Young, 2008; Biffis, Denuit,
and Devolder, 2010; Chen and Cummins, 2010; Cox, Lin, and Pedersen, 2010; Bauer,
Bo¨rger, and Ruß, 2010; Bauer, Benth, and Kiesel, 2012; Deng, Brockett, and MacMinn,
2012; Wang, Huang, and Liu, 2013, among others).
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce longevity swaps
and formalize their payoffs. Although the setup covers the case of both bespoke
and index-based swaps, we focus on the former to keep the article focused. In “The
Marking-to-Market (MTM) Process” section, we examine the marking to market of a
longevity swap during its lifetime to demonstrate the impact of counterparty risk on
the hedger’s balance sheet. The “Counterparty Default Risk” section introduces bilat-
eral default risk in longevity swap valuation formulae, identifying the main channels
through which default risk affects the market value of swaps. The “Collateralization”
section introduces credit enhancement in the form of collateralization and shows how
longevity swap rates are affected even in the presence of full cash collateralization
(and hence absence of default losses). We compute swap rates by using an iterative
procedure based on the LSMC approach. In the “Examples” section, several stylized
examples are provided to understand how different collateralization rules may affect
longevity swap rates. Concluding remarks are offered in the “Conclusion”. Further
details and technical remarks are collected in an Appendices A and B.
Longevity Swaps
We consider a hedger (insurer selling annuities, pension fund), referred to as party
h, and a hedge supplier (reinsurer, investment bank), referred to as counterparty
hs. Agent h has the obligation to pay amounts XT1 ,XT2 , . . ., possibly dependent on
interest rates and inflation, to each survivor at fixed dates 0 < T1 ≤ T2, . . . of an initial
population of n individuals (annuitants or pensioners) alive at time 0. We are clearly
restricting our attention to homogeneous liabilities for ease of exposition, more general
situations requiring obvious modifications. Party h’s liability at a generic payment
date T > 0 is given by the random variable (n−NT)XT , whereNT counts the number
of deaths experienced by the population during the period [0,T]. Assuming that the
individuals’ death times have common intensity14 (t)t≥0, the expected number of
survivors at time T can be written as EP [n−NT] = npT , with the survival probability
pT given by (see Appendix A):
pT := EP
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
t dt
)]
. (1)
13Similarly, Biffis and Blake (2010b, 2013) endogenize longevity risk premia by introducing
asymmetric information and capital requirements in a risk-neutral setting.
14As discussed more in detail in Appendix A, for tractability we restrict our attention to the
case of doubly stochastic (or Cox, conditionally Poisson) death times; see Biffis, Denuit, and
Devolder (2010).
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Here and in the following,Pdenotes the real-world probability measure. The intensity
could be modeled by using, for example, any of the stochastic mortality models con-
sidered in Cairns et al. (2009). For our examples, we will rely on the simple Lee–Carter
mortality projection model (Lee and Carter, 1992).
Let us now consider a financial market and introduce the risk-free rate process (rt)t≥0
(in practice, an overnight rate). We assume that a market-consistent price of the lia-
bilities can be computed by using a risk-neutral measure P˜, equivalent to P, such that
the death times have the same intensity process (t)t≥0 (with different dynamics, in
general, under the two measures; see Biffis, Denuit, and Devolder, 2010). The time 0
market value of the aggregate liability can then be written as
EP˜
[∑
i
exp
(
−
∫ Ti
0
rtdt
)
(n−NTi )XTi
]
= n
∑
i
EP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ Ti
0
(rt + t) dt
)
XTi
]
.
For the moment, we take the pricing measure as given: we will give it more structure
later on.
We consider two instruments which h can enter into with hs to hedge its exposure: a be-
spoke longevity swap and an index-based longevity swap. In these swaps, in contrast
to interest rate swaps, the fixed leg will be a series of fixed rates, each one pertaining
to an individual payment date. The reason is that mortality increases substantially at
old ages and a single fixed rate would introduce a growing mismatch between the
cashflows provided by the swap and those needed by the hedger. However, as with
interest rate swaps, we can treat a longevity swap as a portfolio of forward contracts
on the underlying floating (survival) rate.15 In this section, we ignore default risk and
focus on individual payments at maturity T > 0. Throughout the article, we always
assume the perspective of the hedger.
A bespoke longevity swapallows party h to pay a fixed ratepN ∈ (0, 1) against the realized
survival rate experienced by the population between time 0 and time T. Assuming a
notional amount equal to the initial population size, n, the net payout to the hedger
at time T is16
n
(
n−NT
n
− pN
)
,
that is, the difference between the realized number of survivors and the preset number
of survivors npN agreed at inception. Letting S0 denote the market value of the swap
15With a slight abuse of terminology, we use the term “swap rate” for individual forward
rates as well as for swap curves (a series of swap rates). We note that swap curves are often
summarized by the improvement factor applied to the survival probabilities of a reference
mortality table/model; see examples in the “Examples” section.
16For ease of exposition, here and in the following sections, we consider contemporaneous
settlement only. Other settlement conventions (e.g., in arrears) have negligible effects but make
valuation formulae more involved when bilateral and asymmetric default risk is introduced.
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at inception, we can write
S0 = nEP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
rt dt
)(
n−NT
n
− pN
)]
= nEP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + t) dt
)]
− nB(0,T)pN (2)
with B(0,T) denoting the time 0 price of a zero-coupon bond with maturity T. By
setting S0 = 0, we obtain the swap rate as
pN = p˜T + B(0,T)−1CovP˜
(
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
rt dt
)
, exp
(
−
∫ T
0
t dt
))
, (3)
where the risk-adjusted survival probability p˜T is defined as in (1) with expectations
taken under P˜. Expression (3) shows that if the intensity of mortality is uncorrelated
with bond market returns (a reasonable first-order approximation), the longevity swap
curve just involves the survival probabilities {p˜Ti} relative to the different maturities
{Ti}. Several studies have recently addressed the issue of how to quantify risk-adjusted
survival probabilities, for example, by calibration to annuity prices and books of life
policies traded in secondary markets, or by use of approximate hedging methods
(see references in the “Introduction”). As there is essentially no publicly available
information on swap rates, for our numerical examples we will suppose a baseline
case in which p˜Ti = pTi for each maturity Ti, and focus on how counterparty default
risk and collateral requirements might generate a positive or negative spread on best
estimate survival rates. This is consistent with market practice where counterparties
would agree on a real-world mortality model (and estimation methodology) to mark-
to-model the swap at future dates. Although in what follows we mainly concentrate
on longevity risk, in practice, the floating payment of a longevity swap might involve
an interbank rate component (e.g., LIBOR) or survival indexation rules different from
the ones considered above. To keep the setup general, we will at times consider in-
struments making a generic variable payment, P, and write the corresponding swap
rate p as
p = EP˜ [P] + B(0,T)−1CovP˜
(
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
rt dt
)
,P
)
. (4)
The setup can easily accommodate index-based longevity swaps, standardized instru-
ments allowing the hedger to pay a fixed rate pI ∈ (0, 1) against the realized value
of a survival index (It)t≥0 at time T. The latter might reflect the mortality experience
of a reference population closely matching17 that of the liability portfolio. Examples
are represented by the LifeMetrics indices developed by J.P. Morgan, the Pensions
17The risk of mismatch is called basis risk. See, for example, Coughlan et al. (2011), Stevens, De
Waegenaere, and Melenberg (2011), Salhi and Loisel (2012), Gatzert and Wesker (2014), and
Cairns (2013) for some results related to this risk dimension.
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Institute and Towers Watson,18 or the Xpect indices developed by Deutsche Bo¨rse.19
The relative advantages and disadvantages of index-based versus bespoke swaps are
discussed, for example, in Biffis and Blake (2010a). Assuming that the index admits
the representation It = exp(−
∫ t
0 
I
s ds), with (
I
t)t≥0 the intensity of mortality of a ref-
erence population, the swap rate pI is given again by Expression (3), but with the
process  replaced by I , and with p˜T replaced by the corresponding risk-adjusted
survival probability p˜IT .
The Marking-to-Market (MTM) Process
Longevity swaps are not currently exchange traded and there is no commonly ac-
cepted framework for counterparties to mark to market/model their positions.20 The
presence of counterparty default risk and collateralization rules, however, makes the
MTM procedure a very important feature of these transactions for at least two reasons.
First, at each payment date, the difference between the variable and preset payment
generates a cash inflow or outflow to the hedger, depending on the evolution of mor-
tality. In the absence of basis risk (which is the case for bespoke solutions), these
differences show a pure “cash-flow hedge” of the longevity exposure in operation.
However, as market conditions change (e.g., mortality patterns, counterparty default
risk), the impact of the swap on the hedger’s balance sheet can evolve dramatically.
For example, even if the swap payments are expected to provide a good hedge against
longevity risk, the hedger’s position will weaken considerably if the expected present
value of the net payments shrinks due to deterioration in the hedge supplier’s credit
quality. Second, for solvency requirements, it is important to value a longevity swap
under extreme market/mortality scenarios (“stress testing”). This means, for exam-
ple, that even if a longevity swap qualifies as a liability on a market-consistent basis, it
might still provide considerable capital relief when valued on a regulatory basis due
to its recognized effectiveness as a hedge.
To illustrate some of these points, let us consider the hypothetical situation of an
insurer h with a liability represented by a group of 10,000 65-year-old annuitants
drawn from the population of England & Wales in 1980. We assume that party h
entered a 25-year pure longevity swap in 1980 and we follow the evolution of the
contract until maturity. The population is assumed to evolve according to the death
rates reported in the Human Mortality Database (HMD) for England & Wales.21 We
assume that interest rate risk is hedged away through interest rate swaps, locking in a
rate of 5 percent throughout the life of the swap. The role of collateral is examined later
on; here, we show how the hedging instrument operates from the point of view of the
hedger. For this bespoke solution, the market value of each floating-for-fixed payment
occurring at a generic date T can be computed by using the valuation formula
St = nEP˜t
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rs ds
)(
n−Nt
n
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
s ds
))]
− nB(t,T)pN (5)
18See http://www.lifemetrics.com. The indices were transferred to LLMA in 2011.
19See http://www.xpect-index.com.
20At the time of writing, LLMA was working on this issue.
21See http://www.mortality.org.
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Figure 1
Survival Curves Computed at the Beginning of Year t = 1980,1985,1990,1995 for
England & Wales Males Aged 65+ t− 1980 in Year t
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Note: Forecasts are based on the Lee–Carter mortality projection model using the latest Human
Mortality Database data available at the beginning of each year t.
for each time t in [0,T] at which no default has yet occurred, with B(t,T) denoting
the market value of a zero-coupon bond with time to maturity T − t, and EP˜t [·] the
conditional expectation under a pricing measure P˜, given the information available
at time t. As a simple benchmark case, we assume that market participants receive
information from the HMD and use the Lee–Carter model to value longevity-linked
cash flows. In other words, at each MTM date (including inception), longevity swap
rates are based on Lee–Carter forecasts computed using the latest HMD information
available.22 Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of swap survival rates for an England
& Wales cohort tracked from age 65 in 1980 to age 90 in 2005. It is clear that the
systematic underestimation of mortality improvements by the Lee–Carter model in
this particular example will mean that the hedger’s position will become increasingly
in the money as the swap matures. This is shown in Figure 2. In practice, the contract
may allow the counterparty to cancel the swap or reset the fixed leg for a nonnegative
22See Dowd et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Cairns et al. (2011) for a comprehensive analysis of alter-
native mortality models; see also Girosi and King (2008) and Pitacco et al. (2009).
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Figure 2
Mark-to-Market Value of the Longevity Swap in the Baseline Case and With the Credit
Spread of Counterparty hs Widening by 50 and 100 Basis Points Over 1988–2005
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Note: In the absence of default, the net payments from the swap are insensitive to credit spread
changes.
fee, but we ignore these features in this example. Figure 2 also reports the sequence
of net cash flows generated by the swap. As interest rate risk is hedged away—and
again ignoring default risk for the moment—cash inflows/outflows arising in the
backtesting exercise only reflect the difference between the realized survival rates
and the swap rates locked in at inception. On the other hand, the swap’s market value
reflects changes in market swap rates, which by assumption follow the updated Lee–
Carter forecasts plotted in Figure 1 and differ from the realized survival rates. As
is evident from Figure 2, the credit exposure of a longevity swap is close to zero at
inception and at maturity, but may be sizable in between, depending on the trade-off
between changes in market/mortality conditions and the residual swap payments
(amortization effect). The credit exposure is quantified by the replacement cost, that
is, the cost that the nondefaulting counterparty would have to incur at the default
time to replace the instrument at market prices then available. As a simple example
that predicts the next section, let us introduce credit risk (but no default) and assume
that in 1988 the credit spread of the hedge supplier widens across all maturities by 50
and 100 basis points. The impact of these two scenarios on the hedger’s balance sheet
is dramatic, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, demonstrating how MTM profits and losses
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Figure 3
Change in Longevity Swap MTM Relative to the Baseline Case and to the Net Payments
From the Swap, When the Credit Spread of Counterparty hs Widens by 50 and 100
Basis Points Over 1988–2005
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can jeopardize a successful cash-flow hedge.
Counterparty Default Risk
The backtesting exercise of the previous section has demonstrated the importance of
the hedge supplier’s credit risk and the MTM procedure in assessing the value of a
longevity swap to the hedger. A correct approach, however, should allow for the fact
that counterparty risk is bilateral. This is the case even when the hedger is a pension
plan. Private sector defined benefit pension plans in countries such as the United
Kingdom are founded on trust law and rely on a promise by (rather than a guarantee
from) the sponsoring employer to pay the benefits to plan members. This promise is
known as the “sponsor covenant.” The strength of the sponsor covenant depends on
both the financial strength of the employer and the employer’s commitment to the
scheme.23 As a reasonable but imperfect proxy for the effect of the sponsor covenant,
23In the United Kingdom, for example, The Actuarial Profession (2005, par. 3.2) defined the
sponsor covenant as: “the combination of (a) the ability and (b) the willingness of the sponsor
to pay (or the ability of the trustees to require the sponsor to pay) sufficient advance contribu-
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we use the sponsor’s default intensity (party h’s default intensity). For large corporate
pension plans, the intensity can be derived/extrapolated from spreads observed in
corporate bond and CDS markets. For smaller plans, an analysis of the funding level
and strategy of the scheme is required.24
Assume that both party h and hs may default at random times h, hs, admitting
default intensities25 (ht )t≥0, (
hs
t )t≥0. Defining by  := min(h, hs) the default time of
the swap transaction, we further assume that, on the event { ≤ T}, the nondefaulting
counterparty, say party i, receives a fraction  j ∈ [0, 1] (i = j, with i, j ∈ {h, hs}) of the
market value of the swap before default, S−, if she is in the money; otherwise, she has
to pay the full predefault market value S− to the defaulting counterparty. Following
Duffie and Huang (1996), we can then write the market value of a swap with notional
amount n as
S0 = nEP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + 1{St<0}(1 −  h)ht + 1{St≥0}(1 −  hs)hst )dt
)(
P − pd
)]
,
(6)
where P denotes the variable payment, pd the fixed rate, and the indicator function
1A takes the value of unity if the event A is true, zero otherwise. To understand the
above formula, note that, in our setting, the risk-neutral valuation of a defaultable
claim involves the use of a default-risk-adjusted short rate rt + ht + hst and dividend
payment ht ( 
h1St−<0 + 1St−≥0) + hst ( hs1St−≥0 + 1St−<0) determined by the recovery
rules described above. As a result, the valuation formula (6) entails discounting at a
spread above the risk-free rate given by
t : = ht + hst − ht ( h1St<0 + 1St≥0) − hst ( hs1St≥0 + 1St<0)
= 1{St<0}(1 −  h)ht + 1{St≥0}(1 −  hs)hst ,
showing a switching-type dependence on the characteristics of the counterparty that
is out of the money at each given time prior to default. The swap rate admits the
representation
pd = EP˜[P] +
CovP˜
(
exp
(
− ∫ T0 (rt +t) dt) ,P)
EP˜
[
exp
(
− ∫ T0 (rt +t) dt)] , (7)
and hence depends in a complex way not only on the interaction between the vari-
able payments and risk factors such as interest rates, default intensities, and recovery
tions to ensure that the scheme’s benefits can be paid as they fall due.” See also The Pensions
Regulator (2009).
24Along the same lines, Inkmann, Blake and Shi (2014) show how the discount rate for the
valuation of pension liabilities should reflect funding risk.
25For tractability and symmetry with the mortality model of the “Longevity Swaps” section,
we work with doubly stochastic default times (see Appendix A). The main drawback is that
the occurrence of default does not affect the conditional default probability of the surviving
counterparty, thus limiting the extent to which close-out risk can be properly modeled.
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rates, but also on the path of the swap’s market value itself. When P does not include
a demographic component, as in the case of interest rate swaps, the covariance term
is typically negative. To see this, consider the case of the standard swap valuation
formula obtained by assuming that both counterparties have the same default inten-
sity (t := ht = hst ) and there is no recovery conditional on default ( h and  hs are
simply zero). If the credit risk of the counterparties is equal to the average credit qual-
ity of the LIBOR panel, the discount rate in (7) is simply given by r + , where  is
just the LIBOR–Treasury (TED) spread. For a swap paying the LIBOR rate, we would
then have a negative covariance term and hence pd ≤ EP˜[P]. When P only includes a
demographic component (as in Expression (3), for example), which is uncorrelated
with the other variables, we would still have a non-null covariance term, due to the
regime-switching nature of the discount rate in formula (7), and the fact that switch-
ing is triggered by the value of the swap, which also depends on the floating rate
of interest. More generally, one might expect the covariance term to be negative, as
longevity-linked payments are likely to be positively correlated with the credit quality
of hedge suppliers26 and companies with significant pension liabilities. The case of
floating payments linked to both mortality and interest rates would then suggest a
swap rate satisfying pd ≤ EP˜[P]. In the next section, we will show that this is not nec-
essarily the case. To understand why, consider the case of full recovery as an example
(set  h and  hs equal to one): Expression (7) reduces to a default-free risk-neutral
valuation formula, irrespective of both the default intensities of the counterparties
and the costs involved by the credit enhancement tools needed to ensure that full
recovery is indeed achieved upon default. This suggests that it is essential to consider
explicitly counterparty risk mitigation tools in the pricing functional.
Counterparty risk can be mitigated in a number of ways, for example, by introducing
termination rights (e.g., credit puts and break clauses) or using credit derivatives (e.g.,
credit default swaps and credit spread options). We will focus on collateralization, a
form of direct credit support requiring each party to post cash or securities when it
is out of the money. For simplicity, we consider the case of cash, which is by far the
most common type of collateral (e.g., ISDA, 2010b) and allows us to disregard close-
out risk, the risk that the value of collateral may change at default. In the interest
rate swaps market, Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) find evidence of costly collateral
by comparing swap market data with swap values based on portfolios of futures
and forward contracts, and by estimating a dynamic term structure model by using
Treasury and swap data. We cannot carry out a similar exercise for longevity swaps,
because there are no publicly available data on these transactions. On the other hand,
we can quantify the funding/opportunity costs associated with the collateral flows
originating from the MTM procedure, as will be shown in the “Examples” section.
Collateralization
Collateral agreements reflect the amount of acceptable credit exposure that each party
agrees to take on. We consider simple collateral rules capturing the main features of the
26This is a reasonable assumption for monoline insurers such as pension buyout firms, but
might be less so for well-diversified reinsurers.
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problem. Formally, let us introduce the predefault collateral process27 (Ct)t≥0, which
indicates how much cash, Ct, to post at each time t prior to default in response to
changes in market conditions, including, in particular, the MTM value of the swap
(we provide explicit examples below). Again, we develop our analysis from the point
of view of the hedger, so that Ct > 0 (Ct < 0) means that party h is holding (posting)
collateral. Using the notation a+ := max(a, 0) and a− := max(−a, 0), we assume the
recovery rules take the following form:
 On the event {h ≤ min(hs,T)} (hedger’s default), party hs recovers any collateral
received by the hedger an instant prior to default, C−
h−, and pays the full MTM
value of the swap to party h if Sh− ≥ 0. The net flow to party h is then S+h− − C
−
h−.
 On the event {hs ≤ min(h,T)} (hedge supplier’s default), party h pays the full
MTM value of the swap to party hs if Shs− < 0, and recovers any collateral received
by hs an instant prior to default, C+
hs−. The net flow to party h can then be written
as −S−
hs− + C
+
hs−.
 Whenever the nondefaulting counterparty, say h, is out of the money, payment of
the full MTM value of the swap is accomplished by party h recovering the extra
amount (S+− − C+−)+ in the case of overcollateralization, or by party h paying the
extra amount (S−− − C−−)+ in case of undercollateralization. In case of full collater-
alization, party h simply loses any collateral posted with hs.
To obtain neater results, it is convenient to express the collateral before default of
either party as a fraction of the MTM value of the swap,
Ct =
(
chst 1{St−≥0} + cht 1{St−<0}
)
St−, (8)
where ch, chs are two nonnegative left-continuous processes giving the fraction of the
MTM value of the swap that is posted as collateral by party h or hs, respectively.28
Finally, we introduce a nonnegative continuous process (ıt)t≥0 representing the yield
on collateral, in the sense that holding/posting collateral of amount Ct yields/costs
instantaneously the net amount ıtCt (after rebate). We can introduce some asymmetry,
by setting ıt = ıht 1{St−<0} + ıhst 1{St−≥0}, so that ıht be interpreted as party h’s net cost
of posting collateral when she is out of the money, and ıhst as the net yield on the
collateral posted by party hs when party h is in the money. In general, one may regard
the collateral costs embedded in swap market values as those of the marginal market
participant. However, when considering individual longevity swap transactions with
bespoke CSAs, it may be convenient to allow the pricing formula to take into account
the cost of collateral of the counterparty; in this case, ıh and ıhs may be regarded as
the cost of posting collateral for party h and hs whenever they are out of the money.
27In other words, the actual collateral process supporting the transaction is (1{>t}Ct)t≥0; hence,
we are not concerned with the value taken by Ct after default.
28Note that representation (8) comes at a cost: we cannot encompass the case when collateral
is posted by a counterparty at inception (a form of overcollateralization), which may be the
case for some transactions.
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Denoting by pc the swap rate available in case of collateralization, we can write the
MTM value of the swap as in (6), but with the spread  now replaced by (see Ap-
pendix A for a proof)
t = ht (1 − cht )1{St<0} + hst (1 − chst )1{St≥0} −
(
ıht c
h
t 1{St<0} + ıhst chst 1{St≥0}
)
. (9)
In the above expression, we recognize the typical features of valuation formulae for
credit-risky securities (e.g., Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2002): the first two terms account
for the fractional recovery of the swap MTM value in case of default of the coun-
terparty, the third one for the costs incurred when posting collateral before default.
An important difference, however, is that in (9) recovery rates depend on collateral
rules, and collateral costs enter explicitly in the discount rate. We now examine simple
special cases to understand better the role of collateral in shaping swap rates.
Full Collateralization
Consider the collateral rule obtained by setting ch and chs equal to one, meaning that
the full MTM value of the swap is received/posted as collateral depending on whether
the MTM procedure results in a positive/negative value for St. As we consider cash
collateral, default is immaterial. In contrast to the “Counterparty Default Risk” section,
however, the expression for the swap MTM value does not reduce to the usual default-
free, risk-neutral valuation formula in general, unless collateral costs are zero. In the
case of symmetric collateral costs, for example, we obtain:
pc = EP˜[P] +
CovP˜
(
exp
(∫ T
0 (ıt − rt) dt
)
,P
)
EP˜
[
exp
(∫ T
0 (ıt − rt) dt
)] . (10)
If the cost of collateral is positively dependent on P, we expect the swap rate to be
higher than pd in expression (7) (see Johannes and Sundaresan, 2007), reflecting the fact
that (costly) collateralization results in the payer of the floating rate being compensated
with a higher fixed rate. In the interest rate swap market, this happens, for example, if
either the short rate or the TED spread are positively correlated with ı. The intuition is
that the floating rate payer will have to both post collateral and incur higher funding
costs when the floating rate increases. In longevity space, one may expect the cost
of collateral to be positively dependent on mortality improvements and negatively
dependent on interest rates, as longevity-linked liabilities are more capital intensive in
low-mortality and low-interest-rate environments (due to lower discounting of future
cashflows). The combined impact of these two effects is ambiguous, and is discussed
in the “Examples” section.
Common Collateral Rules
According to ISDA (2010b), it is typical for collateral agreements to specify collateral
triggers based on the market value of the swap or other relevant variables (credit rat-
ings, credit spreads, etc.) crossing prespecified threshold levels. In longevity swaps,
the CSA may define collateral rules that depend on the underlying mortality experi-
ence, involve path dependence (with respect to mortality experience/expectations, for
instance), and monitor different variables at different frequency. For example, the CSA
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may allow for daily collateral adjustments for financial conditions, quarterly adjust-
ments for death experience, and annual adjustments for changes in future mortality
improvements. The following examples illustrate some of these aspects:
(a) Set chst = 1{St−≥s(t)} and cht = 1{St−≤s(t)} (for continuous functions s, s defined on
[0,T] and satisfying s ≤ s), meaning that the hedge supplier (hedger) is required
to post full collateral if the swap’s MTM value is above (below) the appropriate
time-dependent threshold. More general collateral rules can be obtained by setting
chst = hst 1{St−≥s(t)} and cht = ht 1{St−≤s(t)}, for suitable processes h, hs depending
on prevailing market conditions or expectations about future mortality.
(b) In longevity swaps, however, it is more common to define collateral thresholds in
terms of mortality forecasts based on a model agreed at contract inception, and
monitor the deaths in the hedger’s population instead of the market value of the
swap. This is due to both the reestimation risk affecting any given mortality model
and the presence of substantial model risk, which most likely would prevent the
counterparties from agreeing on a common model at future dates. We can set, for
example, chst = 1{Nt−≤˛(t)} and cht = 1{Nt−≥ˇ(t)}, for continuous functions ˛ and ˇ
satisfying 0 ≤ ˛ ≤ ˇ ≤ n, meaning that the hedge supplier (hedger) is required to
post full collateral if realized deaths are below (above) the relevant threshold.
(c) For an index-based swap, it may be more convenient to work with the mortality
intensity I of the reference population (see the “Longevity Swaps” section) and
set chst = 1{∫ t
0
Isds≤a(t)}
and cht = 1{∫ t
0
Isds≥b(t)}
for (say) continuous functions a, b
satisfying 0 ≤ a ≤ b. This means that collateral posting is triggered at each time t
if the realized value of the longevity index, exp(− ∫ t0 Isds), falls outside the open
interval
(
exp(−b(t)), exp(−a(t))).
(d) As was emphasized in “The Marking-to-Market (MTM) Process” section, the
severity of counterparty risk depends on the credit quality of the counterpar-
ties. This is why collateralization agreements may set collateral thresholds that
explicitly depend on credit ratings or CDS spreads. A simple example of this
practice can be obtained as a special case of (a) by setting chst = 1{Nt−≤˛(t)}∪{hst ≥},
cht = 1{Nt−≥ˇ(t)}∪{ht ≥}, meaning that, at each time t, the hedger (hedge supplier) re-
ceives collateral when either realized deaths fall below the level ˛(t) (respectively,
ˇ(t)) or the hedge supplier’s (respectively hedger’s) default intensity overshoots
a given threshold  ≥ 0. Note that both ch and chs can be nonzero at the same time
(e.g., on the event {Nt− ≤ ˛(t)} ∩ {ht ≥ }), but Expression (8) ensures that only
the party out of the money will have to post collateral.
Computing the Swap Rate
The recursive nature of swap valuation formulae in the case of bilateral and asym-
metric counterparty risk (in a doubly stochastic setting) is noted by Duffie and Huang
(1996). By modeling the recovery rates and the difference in counterparties’ credit
spreads in reduced form, however, they could use a simple iterative procedure to
determine the swap rate.29 Here, we explicitly allow for the impact of collateral and
29Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) sidestep recursivity issues by considering full collateraliza-
tion and symmetric default risk and collateral costs.
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the MTM procedure in the pricing functional: working in a high-dimensional Markov
setting, we use an LSMC approach. Exploiting the properties of the doubly stochastic
setup, we do not model death/default times explicitly, but just rely on the mortal-
ity/default intensities (see Algorithm 2 in Bacinello, Biffis, and Millossovich, 2010, for
example). The procedure involves the following steps (we focus on the individual
forward rates for convenience):
Step 1. For an arbitrary maturity Ti and fixed rate pci := pcTi ∈ (0, 1), generate M sim-
ulated paths of the state variable process, X, under P˜ along the time grid Ti := {0 <
t1, t2, . . . , tni = Ti}. Denote by Si,mtj the (ex-dividend) MTM value of the swap, and by
f i,mtj the net payments
30 from the swap (excluding collateral flows) at time tj, on path
m, and for given forward rate pci .
Step 2. Compute recursively the approximate31 value S
i,m
tj
of the swap at time tj (for
j = ni − 1, . . . , 0 with t0 = 0) as Si,mtj = ˇ∗i,j · e(Xmtj ), where e(x) := (e1(x), . . . , eH(x))T and
{e1, . . . , eH} is a finite set of functions taken from a suitable basis of L2(), and ˇ∗i,j is
given by
ˇ∗i,j = arg min
ˇ∈RH
M∑
m=1
{(
Si,mtj+1 + f
i,m
tj+1
)
exp
(
−
∫ tj+1
tj
rmu du
)
− ˇe
(
Xmtj
)}2
,
where Si,mtj =
∑ni
h=j+1 exp
(
− ∫ thtj
(
rmu + mu (S
i,m
tj
, . . . ,S
i,m
th−1 )
)
du
)
f i,mth is the discounted
cumulative value of the cash flows originating from the swap allowing for collateral
costs, where the spread m depends on the approximations {Si,mtj+u}
ni−1
u=0 determined in
the previous iterations, which are used to check at each time tk ∈
{
tj, . . ., th−1
}
whether
the collateral thresholds are triggered, and determine the corresponding amount/cost
of collateral over the time interval [tk , tk+1). The value of the swap at time t0 is then
given by 1M
∑M
m=1 S
i,m
t0
.
Step 3. Iterate32 the above procedure over different values for pci until a candidate rate
pc∗i is found, such that the initial price, S
i,m
t0
, is close enough to zero.
30In the case of a Ti-forward contract, we have f
i,m
tj
= 0 for 0 ≤ j < ni, and f i,mtj =
n
(
n−1(n−NmTi ) − p
c
i
)
for j = ni; compare with expression (2).
31The approximation is used to determine which party is in the money and which is out of the
money (and hence the costs of default risk and collateral) in the following step of the recursion.
It is not used in the first time interval,
[
tj, tj+1
)
, as we do not know the sign of S
i,m
tj
; the smaller
the first time step of the discretization, the more innocuous this assumption. Alternatively,
one could use the approximation S
i,m
tj
= Si,mtj+1 , and consider default risk and collateral costs at
all time steps.
32In the numerical examples of the “Examples” section, we use a combination of bisection,
secant, and inverse quadratic interpolation methods to compute pc∗i (see Forsythe et al., 1976).
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Table 2
Parameter Values for the Dynamics of X Given in Appendix B
	1 0.969 
1 −0.053 1 0.008 UK
	2 0.832 
3 −0.014 2 0.155 ıK −0.888
	3 1.669 
4 0.007 3 0.009 K 1.156
	4 0.045 
5 0.055 4 0.010 US
	5 0.990 	5,1 0.147 5 0.690 ıK −0.761
	3,1 −0.163 	5,2 1.340 2 0.046 K 1.078
	4,1 0.114 	5,3 2.509 3 0.003
	3,4 0.804 	5,4 −0.133 4 0.007
	4,2 −0.038 	5,6 −0.002 5 0.115 1,2 −0.036
Note: The estimates for X(5) are based on the assumption that capital increases are funded by
counterparties at 6 percent plus the LIBOR rate. As in Johannes and Sundaresan (2007), we set
the parameter 
2 equal to zero.
Of course, the procedure relies on knowledge of the dynamics of the state variable
process under the pricing measure. To this end, in the next section, we outline a calibra-
tion approach based on the joint use of fixed-income data and funding costs/capital
requirements for longevity-linked liabilities.
Examples
We use a continuous-time model for the risk-free yield curve, the LIBOR and mortality
rates, as well as for the cost of collateral. The credit risk of party hs is assumed to
be equal to the average credit quality of the LIBOR panel, so that the TED spread
would be party hs’s default intensity if there were zero recovery upon default (see
the “Counterparty Default Risk” section). We then set h = hs + and consider two
cases: party h is either of the same credit quality as party hs ( = 0) or is more credit
risky ( > 0).
We describe the evolution of uncertainty by a six-dimensional state variable vector
X with the Gaussian dynamics reported in Appendix B. The first four components
are: the short rate, r = X(1), assumed to revert to the long-run central tendency factor
X(2), representing the slope of the risk-free yield curve; the TED spread X(3), so that
the LIBOR rate is given by X(1) + X(3); and the net yield on collateral in the inter-
est rate swap market, X(4). The latter factor is used to draw a comparison with the
cost of collateral in the longevity swap market. The remaining two components de-
scribe the opportunity cost of longevity swap dealers, X(5), and the log-intensity of
mortality of a given population, log = X(6). Under the assumption of independence
between (X(1),X(2),X(3),X(4)) and X(6), we can estimate separately the dynamics of
the two groups of factors. For the first vector, we rely on the estimates of Johannes
and Sundaresan (2007), who use weekly Treasury and swap data from 1990 to 2002 to
obtain the parameter values reported in Table 2. For the intensity exp(X(6)t ), we use a
continuous-time version of the Lee–Carter mortality projection model for a cohort of
65-year-olds; see Appendix B for details.
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Figure 4
Swap Margins pcTi/pTi − 1 Computed for Different Maturities {Ti} and Collateral Rules,
With ıh = h, ıhs = ıh +, and h = hs +, with  = 0 (Dashed Lines) or  = 0.01
(Solid Lines): No Collateral (Squares), Full Collateralization (Circles)
5 10 15 20 25
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
payment date
sw
ap
 m
ar
gin
 a
nd
 su
rv
iva
l im
pr
ov
em
en
t p
er
ce
nt
ile
s
λh=λhs
35 λh=λhs+Δ
full collateral
λh=λhs+Δ
no collateral
65
55
45
25
75
Note: The underlying is a cohort of 10,000 U.S. males aged 65 at the beginning of 2008. Forward
rates are plotted against the percentiles of improvements in survival rates based on Lee–Carter
forecasts.
As a first example, we focus on funding costs and simply take ıhs = X(3) and ıh =
X(3) +, meaning that the hedger’s net cost of collateral coincides with its funding
costs net of the short rate (assuming it is rebated), whereas the hedger’s net yield on
the collateral amounts posted by party hs coincides with the TED spread. Assuming
that the pricing formula uses information on the collateral costs of the counterparty,
an alternative interpretation is that each party’s net collateral costs coincide with their
borrowing costs net of the risk-free rate. In the case of asymmetric default risk, we
consider values of 100 and 200 basis points for .
We compute the longevity swap rates for a 25-year swap written on a population of
10,000 U.S. males aged 65 at the beginning of 2008. In Figure 4, we plot the underlying
forward rates obtained for different collateralization rules against the percentiles of
survival rate improvements based on Lee–Carter forecasts. We see that margins are
positive and increasing with payment maturity in the case of symmetric default risk,
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Figure 5
Swap Margins pcTi/pTi − 1 Computed for Different Maturities {Ti} and Collateral Rules,
With ıh = h, ıhs = ıh + 0.01, and h = hs + 0.01: No Collateral (Squares), Full
Collateralization (Circles), Full Collateral Posted Only by Party h (Stars) or Party hs
(Diamonds)
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Note: The underlying is a cohort of 10,000 U.S. males aged 65 at the beginning of 2008. Forward
rates are plotted against the percentiles of improvements in survival rates based on Lee–Carter
forecasts.
for both uncollateralized and fully collateralized transactions. As soon as we introduce
asymmetry in default risk ( > 0), however, margins widen in the case of no collat-
eralization, reflecting the fact that the hedger needs to pay an additional premium
on account of its higher credit risk. In the case of full collateralization, counterparty
risk is neutralized, but the hedger is compensated for her higher funding costs and
the positive dependence between funding costs and collateral amounts discussed be-
fore: equilibrium swap rates are pushed lower and produce a negative margin on best
estimate swap rates.
In Figure 5, we examine the swap margins induced by one-way collateralization in
the case of asymmetric default risk. When only the hedge supplier has to post full
collateral, forward rates are higher than best estimate survival probabilities, meaning
that the hedger has to compensate the hedge supplier for bearing both the cost of risk
mitigation and the hedger’s higher default risk. The opposite is true when it is the
hedger who has to post full collateral when out of the money. In this case, swap margins
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Table 3
Forward Rate Spreads pcTi − pTi (in Basis Points) for Different Collateralization Rules,
Maturities, and Spread  ∈ {0,0.01,0.02}
Maturity ch = 0 ch = 0 ch = 1 ch = 1
h = hs + Payment chs = 0 chs = 1 chs = 0 chs = 1
ıh = ıhs + (Years) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps)
15 0.03 11.34 −11.76 0.05
 = 0 20 1.11 19.93 −17.94 0.86
25 1.50 21.25 −18.35 1.24
15 5.45 16.79 −17.29 −5.84
 = 100 bps 20 10.16 28.95 −27.08 −8.23
25 10.96 30.75 −27.76 −9.19
15 11.30 22.29 −22.90 −11.25
 = 200 bps 20 19.26 38.06 −36.16 −17.42
25 19.46 40.27 −37.02 −18.38
Note: The LSMC procedure uses 5,000 paths over a quarterly grid with polynomial basis func-
tions of order 3, and is repeated for 100 seeds.
are clearly negative and decreasing in payment maturity. These effects are amplified
when the asymmetry in counterparties’ credit quality is greater, as can be seen from
the spreads reported in Table 3 for some key maturities and collateralization rules.
Plotting the swap rate margins against best estimate mortality improvements allows
one to interpret the swap rates as outputs of a pricing functional based on adjust-
ments to a reference mortality model (which is common practice in longevity space;
see Biffis, Denuit, and Devolder, 2010). On the other hand, longevity swap spreads are
Table 4
Comparison of Interest Rate Swaps (IRSs) With Longevity Swaps
IRS (ıhs = X(4)) Longevity (ıhs = X(3))
Maturity ch = 0 ch = 1 ch = 1 ch = 0 ch = 1 ch = 1
h = hs + Payment chs = 1 chs = 0 chs = 1 chs = 1 chs = 0 chs = 1
ıh = ıhs + (Years) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps)
15 −7.96 −44.97 −52.86 11.34 −11.76 0.05
 = 0 20 −12.68 −42.64 −56.22 19.93 −17.94 0.86
25 −17.94 −40.98 −58.92 21.25 −18.35 1.24
15 −8.00 −67.87 −75.23 16.79 −17.29 −5.84
 = 100 bps 20 −12.65 −63.84 −77.42 28.95 −27.08 −8.23
25 −17.65 −60.63 −77.64 30.75 −27.76 −9.19
Note: The IRS spreads represent the difference betweeen the futures prices (the opportunity
cost of collateral coincides with the risk-free rate for both parties) and the forward rate for a
collateralized transaction (for different collateralization rules, maturities, and credit risk).
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easier to compare with those emerging in other transactions. In Table 4, we make a
comparison with the interest rate swap spreads implied by our parameterization of
the state vector (X(1),X(2),X(3),X(4)). In particular, we report the difference between
interest rate futures prices (obtained by considering full collateralization and setting
the cost of collateral equal to the risk-free rate) and interest rate forward rates for
collateralized transactions with collateral costs equal to the funding costs of the coun-
terparties. Spreads are negative, in line with the intuition that interest rate risk leads to
a discount for the payer of the fixed rate, as discussed in the “Introduction”, and are of
a magnitude consistent with the findings of Johannes and Sundaresan (2007). The re-
sults show that longevity swap spreads are comparable with, and often much smaller
(in absolute value) than those found in the interest rate swap market. For example,
in the case of bilateral full collateralization, longevity forward rates for 15- to 25-year
maturities embed a spread substantially smaller than that of interest rate forwards of
corresponding maturity. In the case of one-way collateralization on the hedger’s side,
in interest rate forward rates we find a discount (negative spread) that turns into a
premium (positive spread) of comparable size in the corresponding longevity swap,
due to the additional and opposite effect of longevity risk on swap rates. Our findings
are robust to the choice of maturity, collateralization rules, and counterparty credit
quality, and are mainly driven by two effects: (1) the different nature of the risk un-
derlying the swap, a survival curve in the case of longevity swaps, and a floating rate
in the case of interest rate swaps, and (2) the fact that interest rate risk and longevity
risk impact longevity swap margins in opposite directions, thus diluting the overall
effect of collateralization on longevity swap rates.
In a second example, we focus on the opportunity cost of selling additional longevity
protection. As we do not have any publicly available transaction data from the
longevity swap market to calibrate X(5), we simulate the capital charges arising from
holding a representative longevity-linked liability in response to changes in the evolu-
tion of the factors (X(1), . . . ,X(4)) andX(6). We therefore “synthesize” the realizations of
X(5) by using information on regulatory requirements to quantify the capital charges
accruing to the counterparties during the life of the swap. In particular, we use the
following bottom-up procedure:
Step 1:We simulate several paths of the factorsX(1), . . . ,X(4) andX(6) along a time grid
Tˆ := {t1, t2, . . . , tk} (with tk = Tˆ > t1 > 0) and under the pricing measure P˜. Again, for
our example, we assume the P˜-dynamics of X(6) to be the same as under the physical
measure.
Step 2: The paths simulated in the previous step are used to compute, at each date
t ∈ Tˆ, the regulatory capital needed by an insurer to hold the liability n−Nt+T , where
T < Tˆ is a representative maturity proxying the average duration of longevity-linked
liabilities in the longevity swap market. We use T = 15 and Tˆ = 40 (years) for our ex-
ample. To compute the capital requirements, we use the Solvency II framework, which
is based on the 99.5 percent Value-at-Risk of the net assets over a 1-year horizon. For
simplicity, we assume holders of longevity exposures to be invested in cash. The dis-
tribution of the 1-year-ahead market-consistent value of the liability usually requires
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nested simulation, unless a simplified approach is adopted. In our setting, market-
consistent discount factors can be computed analytically based on the 1-year-ahead
simulated realizations, as the pair (X(1),X(2)) is an affine process. We use the LSMC
approach (see the “Computing the Swap Rate” section) to determine the expected
number of survivors.33
Step 3: We use the simulated capital charges obtained in the previous step to compute
the gains/costs incurred to reduce/increase capital at each time step along each sim-
ulated path. We assume that capital charges are funded at the counterparties’ funding
cost, plus a spread of 6 percent34 to reflect the opportunity cost of diverting to an
individual liability funds that could be used to support insurance business at the ag-
gregate level. The simulated realizations of the opportunity cost of capital (see Figure 7
for an example) are used to estimate the dynamics of X(5) reported in Appendix A.
The parameter estimates are included in Table 2.
In the case of symmetric collateralization, we find results comparable to those obtained
by using the counterparties’ funding costs for the process ı. However, Figure 6 shows
that margins increase (decrease) considerably when one-way collateralization on the
hedge supplier’s (hedger’s) side is considered. This is because the party required to
post collateral explicitly takes into account tail events in computing collateral costs,
whereas in Figure 5 funding costs where computed on the basis of the market value
of the longevity swap.
Finally, we study the sensitivity of longevity forward spreads to the volatility of the net
collateral costX(5). To close off the interest rate risk channel, we fix the factorsX(1),X(2)
equal to their long-run means. Table 5 reports the results obtained for different values
of the volatility parameter 5 in the case of symmetric default risk and bilateral full
collateralization. We see that spreads increase dramatically for large values of the
volatility parameter, but are comparable to those found in the previous examples for
reasonable volatility levels (i.e., below 5 percent).
Conclusion
In this study, we have provided a framework for understanding and quantifying the
cost of bilateral default risk and collateral strategies on longevity risk solutions. The
results address the concerns aired by potential hedgers regarding how to measure the
trade-off between the hedge effectiveness of longevity-linked instruments and the
counterparty risk they entail. We have described a methodology for pricing longevity
swaps that explicitly takes into account the dynamics of the MTM process, the col-
lateral flows it generates, and the costs associated with the posting of collateral. We
have shown how collateral strategies can mitigate if not eliminate counterparty risk,
but inevitably introduce an extra cost that must be borne by the hedge supplier or by
the hedger, depending on how their credit quality and collateral costs compare with
33See Stevens, De Waegenaere, and Melenberg (2010) for other approximation methods in the
context of Lee–Carter forecasts.
34This is a reasonable, conservative value for the return on capital of longevity swaps dealers;
anecdotal evidence suggests that it can be twice as large.
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Figure 6
Swap Margins pcTi/pTi − 1 Computed for Different Maturities {Ti} and Collateral Rules,
With h = hs and ıh = ıhs = X(5), Where the Parameter Estimates for the Dynamics
of X(5) are Given in Table 2. Collateral Rules: No Collateral (Squares), Full Collateral-
ization (Circles), Full Collateral Posted Only by Party h (Stars) or hs (Diamonds)
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Note: Forward rates are plotted against the percentiles of improvements in survival rates based
on Lee–Carter forecasts (65-year old U.S. males in 2008).
Table 5
Sensitivity With Respect to Parameter 5
5 p25 p
c Spread (bps)
0.0005 0.201425 0.201469 2.15
0.0100 0.201425 0.201822 19.68
0.0150 0.201425 0.202009 28.96
0.0200 0.201425 0.202196 38.26
0.1000 0.201425 0.205237 189.24
0.1500 0.201425 0.207184 285.90
Note: The baseline estimated parameter values for the dynamics of X(5) are 5 = 0.000254,
	5 = 1.005073, 5 = 0.000542, 
5 = 0.000269, 	53 = 0.003648, 	54 = 0.000018, 	56 = 0.000261. We
compute 25-year forward rates and spreads (in basis points) under full collateralization by
setting X(1),X(2) equal to their long run means.
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Figure 7
A Simulated Path of the Capital Charges Accruing to the Longevity Swap Dealer Holding
a Representative Longevity-Linked Liability n−N
t+T Under the Solvency II Regulatory
Framework
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each other. Our most significant and useful finding is that the overall cost of the col-
lateralization strategies in the longevity swap market is comparable with, and often
smaller than, that found in the much more liquid interest-rate swap market. Hence,
there is no reason to suppose that counterparty risk will provide an insurmountable
barrier to the further development of the longevity swap market. Our analysis accord-
ingly provides a robust framework for comparing the costs of credit enhancement in
bespoke longevity swaps with the benefits offered by competing solutions such as
securitization and indexed swaps.
Appendix A: Details on the Setup
We take as given a filtered probability space (,F, (Ft)t∈[0,T],P), and model the death
times in a population of n individuals (annuitants or pensioners) as stopping times
1, . . . , n. This means that at each time t the information carried byFt allows us to state
whether each individual has died or not. The hedger’s liability is given by the random
variable
∑n
i=1 1{i>T}, which can be equivalently written as n−
∑n
i=1 1{i≤T} = n−NT .
We assume that death times coincide with the first jumps of n conditionally Pois-
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son processes with common random intensity of mortality (t)t≥0 under both P and
an equivalent martingale measure P˜ (see Biffis, Denuit, and Devolder, 2010, for
details). The expected number of survivors over [0,T] under the two measures
can then be expressed as EP
[∑n
i=1 1{i>T}
]
= npT and EP˜
[∑n
i=1 1{i>T}
]
= np˜T , with
pT and p˜T given by the expectation (1) computed under the relevant probability
measure.
Consider any stopping time i satisfying the above assumptions, an integrable random
variable Y ∈ FT and a bounded process (Xt)t∈[0,T] such that each Xt is measurable
with respect to Ft−, the information available up to, but not including, time t. Then a
security paying Y at time T in case i > T and Xi at time 
i in case i ≤ T has time 0
price
EP˜
[∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
(rt + t) dt
)
Xss ds+ exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + t) dt
)
Y
]
.
Consider now two stopping times i, j, with intensities i,j, jointly satisfying the
above assumptions (i.e., they are the first jump times of the components of a bivariate
conditionally Poisson process). A security paying Y at time T in case neither stop-
ping time has occurred (i.e., min(i, j) > T) and Xt in case the first occurrence is at
time t ∈ (0,T] (i.e., t = min(i, j)) has time 0 price given by the same formula, with
t replaced by it + jt. This follows from the fact that the stopping time min(i, j)
is the first jump time of a conditionally Poisson process with intensity (it + jt)t≥0
(e.g., Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2002). The expressions presented in the “Longevity
Swaps” section to the “Collateralization” section all follow from these simple
results.
Proof of Expression (9): Let (ıht )t≥0 denote the hedger’s net cost of posting collateral
and (ıhst )t≥0 the net yield on the collateral amounts received from party hs, meaning
that holding collateral of amount Ct provides the hedger with an instantaneous yield
equal to ıhst C
+
t − ıht C−t . We assume that collateral is bounded andCt is measurable with
respect to Ft− for all t ∈ [0,T]. Parties h and hs are assumed to have death (default)
times satisfying the properties reviewed above, in particular having intensities h, hs.
Recalling the recovery rules described in the “Collateralization” section, we can then
write:
S0 = EP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + ht + hst )dt
)(
P − pd
)]
+EP˜
[∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
(rt + ht + hst )dt
)(
hs (S
+
s − C−s ) + hss (C+s − S−s )
)
ds
]
+EP˜
[∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
(rt + ht + hst )dt
)
(ıhss C
+
s − ıhs C−s )ds
]
.
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Using representation (8), the amount recovered by the nondefaulting counterparty at
time  = min(h, hs) ≤ T is
1{=h}S−(c
h
 1{S−<0} + 1{S−≥0}) + 1{=hs}S−(chs 1{S−≥0} + 1{S−<0}),
where we see that ch, chs replace the recovery rates  h, hs introduced in the “Coun-
terparty Default Risk” section. We can then write
S0 = EP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + ht + hst )dt
)(
P − pd
)]
+EP˜
[∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
(rt + ht + hst )dt
)(
hs + (hss + ıhss )chss )S+s
−(hss + (hs + ıhs )chs )S−s
)
ds
]
= EP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + t)dt
)(
P − pd
)]
,
which is nothing other than the usual risk-neutral valuation formula for a security
with terminal payoff ST = P − pd paying continuously a dividend equal to a fraction
(hs + (hss + ıhss )chss )1{St−≥0} + (hss + (hs + ıhs )chs )1{St−<0}
of the security’s market value an instant before each time t ∈ [0,T]. Subtracting the
dividend rate from h + hs and rearranging terms we obtain expression (9) for .
Appendix B: Details on the Numerical Examples
The numerical examples are based on a six-dimensional state variable process X =
(X(1), . . . ,X(6))T having P˜-dynamics
dX(1)t =
(
k1(X
(2)
t − X(1)t ) − 
1
)
dt+ 1dW(1)t
dX(2)t =
(
k2(2 − X(2)t ) − 
2
)
dt+ 2dW(2)t
dX(3)t =
(
	3(3 − X(3)t ) + 	3,1(X(1)t − 2) + 	3,4(X(4)t − 4) − 
3
)
dt+ 3dW(3)t
dX(4)t =
(
	4(4 − X(4)t ) + 	4,1(X(1)t − 2) + 	4,2(X(2)t − 2) − 
4
)
dt+ 4dW(4)t
dX(5)t =
(
	5(5 − X(5)t ) + 	5,1(X(1)t − 2) + 	5,2(X(2)t − 2) + 	5,3(X(3)t − 3)
+ 	5,4(X(4)t − 4) + 	5,6(X(6)t − E0[X(6)t ]) − 
5
)
dt+ 5dW(5)t
dX(6)t =
(
Ax(t) + Bx(t)(X(6)t − ax(t))
)
dt+ 6(t, x)dW(6)t ,
where W = (W(1), . . . ,W(6))T is a standard P˜-Brownian motion, the constants 
i rep-
resent market prices of risk, x is the age of a reference cohort of individuals at time
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0, and Ax(·),Bx(·), 6(·, x) are functions characterizing the dynamics of X(6)t = X(6)t,x (see
below for explicit definitions). The P-dynamics are obtained by removing the market
prices of risk from the drifts of the relevant factors and replacing the innovations
with the corresponding P-Brownian innovations. We assume that X(6) has the same
dynamics under the physical and the pricing probability measures, consistent with
our baseline case of a swap rate equal to pT for each T in the absence of collateral. The
Brownian innovations are uncorrelated, with the exception of the pair (W(1),W(2)),
whose instantaneous correlation is denoted by 1,2.
For the first four factors, we use data from Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) who
rely on a two-stage maximum likelihood procedure based on weekly data sampled
on Wednesdays, from 1990 to 2002, and set the long-run mean of X(3) equal to the
average of the 3-month TED spread over the sampling period. For the log-intensity
X(6), we use the mortality model described below, and assume that the Brownian
component W(6) is uncorrelated with the other ones. The intensity of mortality is
modeled using a continuous-time version of the Lee–Carter model (see Biffis and De-
nuit, 2006; Biffis, Denuit, and Devolder, 2010). We first use the annual central death
rates {my,s} for U.S. males from the Human Mortality Database to estimate the model
my,s = exp(˛(y) + ˇ(y)Ks) for dates s = 1961, 1962, . . . , 2007 and ages y = 20, 21, . . . , 89
with Singular Value Decomposition (see Lee and Carter, 1992). The resulting estimates
for K are then fitted with the process Ks+1 = ıKKs + Kε, with ε ∼ N(0, 1). For fixed
age x = 65, the estimates for { ˆ˛ (x + h), ˆˇ (x + h)}h=0,1,... are interpolated with differ-
entiable functions ax(t), bx(t). The functions Ax,Bx, 6 are finally obtained by setting
Ax(t) = a′x(t) + bx(t)ıK , Bx(t) = b′x(t)bx(t)−1 and 6(t, x) = bx(t)K . As we consider a sin-
gle cohort aged x at the reference date 0, here and throughout the article we simply
writeX(6)t := X(6)t,x . The extension to multiple (say l) cohorts, would require the analysis
of the vector of log-intensities (X(6)t,x1 , . . . ,X
(6)
t,xl ). Although the drift and volatility pa-
rameters would be different for each X(6)t,xi , the Lee–Carter specification assumes that
all cohorts are affected by the same Brownian component W(6). Other models may
instead require the introduction of additional sources of uncertainty.
To estimate the dynamics ofX(5), the component of collateral costs related to longevity
risk, we implement the procedure discussed in the “Examples” section, setting the
duration T of the representative liability equal to 15. We simulate forward all of the
other state variables, and at each time step we compute the opportunity cost of capital
arising from the capital charges accruing to the hedge supplier based on the simulated
mortality and market conditions. The expectation appearing in the drift ofX(5) ensures
that the longevity capital charges react to departures of realized mortality from the
term structure of survival rates estimated at inception. We assume that funding occurs
at the LIBOR rate plus a fixed spread of 6 percent, a conservative value for the cost
of internal capital. To obtain the net cost of collateral, we take into account the rebate
of the risk-free rate. We estimate the parameters for the dynamics of X(5) based on
the simulated realizations of X(5) (an example is depicted in Figure 7). The parameter
estimates are obtained by regressing the simulated dynamics ofX(5) on the simulated
vector of state variables (X(1),X(2),X(3),X(4),X(6)). We simulate 10, 000 paths over 40
The Cost of Counterparty Risk and Collateralization in Longevity Swaps 31
years on a semiannual grid. For each simulation, we set the parameter 5 equal to the
average of X(5) along the simulated path. The regression estimates obtained for each
simulated path are averaged across all simulations to obtain the final values reported
in Table 2.
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